

# SCTIW Review

Journal of the Society for Contemporary Thought and the Islamicate World

ISSN: 2374-9288

June 23, 2015

## *Interventioners: Humanitarian, Military, and Otherwise*

Neda Atanasoski, *Humanitarian Violence: The U.S. Deployment of Diversity*, University of Minnesota Press, 2013, 280 pp., \$25.00 US (pbk), ISBN 9780816680948.

Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, eds., *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions*, Zone Books, 2013, 406 pp., \$24.95 US (pbk), ISBN 9781935408017.

“[W]hen I write a novel,” Aminatta Forna proposed, “it is like taking a thought for a walk. I came to set a story in Croatia because I had become fascinated by the subject of civil war, having examined it over the course of a memoir and two novels set in Sierra Leone. I wanted to move the action beyond the African continent and into the west, where I would invite readers to reconsider some of their assumptions about wars all over Africa.” Forna’s remarks appear in a recent essay for the London *Guardian* (13 February 2015), “Don’t judge a book by its author,” in which the writer raises the seemingly practical—if still altogether unpracticed—question, “Where should a bookshop shelve a novel set in Croatia and written in English by a Scottish Sierra Leonian author?”<sup>1</sup> Forna is referring specifically to her latest novel, *The Hired Man* (2013), set, as she notes, in Croatia, but referencing too its contrast to her earlier works: the memoir of her search for her murdered father, *The Devil That Danced on the Water* (2002), and her investigation into who might have been responsible for the disappearance/death of the celebrated Sierra Leonian leader; the collection of interlocking women’s stories from her—and her father’s—land, *Ancestor Stones* (2006); and *The Memory of Love* (2011), a novel that narrates poignantly if brutally the tribulations of humanitarian aid workers in civil war-torn Sierra Leone. What, then, given both her erstwhile bibliography and her own biography, was Forna doing now by setting *The Hired Man* in a remote Croatian village?

According to Forna, there was at least one marked difference between the two settings to her several narratives—that between the conflicts in Eastern Europe and those in West Africa: “The war in Sierra Leone has been characterised by amputations; the rebel army hacked off people’s hands and limbs. The former Yugoslavia became a snipers’ war. We

---

<sup>1</sup> Aminatta Forna, “Don’t judge a book by its author,” *The Guardian*, February 13, 2015.

were a nation of farmers and they were a nation of hunters. When people go to war they pick up the first thing to hand, be it a machete or a rifle.”<sup>2</sup> That putative difference—between amputations and sniping, between machetes and rifles—is recounted differently still in rather less fictional reports on the respective geopolitical conflicts that Aminatta Forna has drawn on in her stories. Neda Atanasoski, for example, in *Humanitarian Violence*, examines a trajectory of U.S. militarism from the “Vietnam War through the Soviet-Afghan War, and the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia,” in order to elaborate on the “deployment of diversity” as a presumptive rationale for combatting both the machetes and the rifles. *Contemporary States of Emergency*, edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, by contrast (and in comparison), collects a combination of essays that examine the global “politics of military and humanitarian interventions.” Writ large, the two volumes translate perhaps a contemporary globality that could eventually map onto the apparent dissonance within Forna’s oeuvre that strains at the connections between Sierra Leone and Croatia. The two books, that is, one a single-authored historical retrospective, or “consolidation of the humanitarian gaze” of the United States’ deployment of “humanitarian violence” over the course of the last many decades, the other a compendium of essays gleaned from a series of conferences (Canada-France 2001-2005) through which international participants compared notes on the “rhythm of life in contemporary societies punctuated by disaster,” syncope the discordant strands of contemporary human right agendas and humanitarian projects. If, that is, and according to Fassin and Pandolfi, “humanitarianism has become the justification for extralegal action,” that it is “still the law of the strongest,” Atanasoski suggests in turn that “humanitarian wars against terror, or atrocity, are regarded as a sacrifice to humanize the world.” But what about Croatia and Sierra Leone? Machetes and rifles? Or, as Forna asked, “where should a bookshop shelve a novel set in Croatia and written in English by a Scottish Sierra Leonian author?” Neither *Humanitarian Violence* nor *Contemporary States of Emergency* are novels, to be sure, but they nonetheless participate in, indeed contribute to, the making of recent plottings of the contested history of a human rights regimen, its characters, its settings, and their attempted renderings; in other words, of a conflicted story—and much-storied—line.

Whereas historian Samuel Moyn has contentiously suggested in *The Last Utopia* that these emphases on human rights, that have since become so current in public policy rhetoric as flourishes to the pronouncements regarding civil wars and natural catastrophes alike, emerged only in the 1970s,<sup>3</sup> TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) scholars have alternatively described, and insisted on, a longer historical narrative—one that includes in its purview colonialism/imperialism—and an expanded geo-political cartography that outlines the differential power relations that have inhered in and that continue to inflect such seemingly neutral compass coordinates as North, South, East, West, between and among, that is, the “three worlds,” the partisans in the Cold War, and the Global South and its “others.” Although Moyn might contend that “human rights were to crystallize as an organizing idealism only on condition of anticolonialism’s decline,”<sup>4</sup> other arguments, such as that of law professor Antony Anghie, from the TWAIL perspective, maintain instead that the “Nineteenth century permitted the sovereign recourse to force. In addition, it created and sought to enforce distinctions between civilized and uncivilized states with the argument that one set of laws was applicable between civilized states in their mutual dealings but that

---

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> See: Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 106.

another set of practices was justified in relation to uncivilized states.”<sup>5</sup> Anghie’s distinction here between “civilized” and “uncivilized” states recapitulates the historical backstory to the current disputed distinctions between the political valences that continue to attach to east and west, north and south, even, if you will, among first, second, and third worlds, as well as their chronological coordinates that map the discussions of “humanitarian violence” and the “politics of military and humanitarian intervention.” Global as they each might be in their concatenating analyses, *Humanitarian Violence* and *Contemporary States of Emergency* nonetheless diverge in the historical and geographical lines that they draw through what Atanasoski, focusing on the example of the United States, refers to as “humanitarian imperialism and its attendant racial imaginaries” (35), on the one hand, and that Fassin and Pandolfi identify as a “global logic of intervention” (10) on the other, a logic that might be “dressed up in the cloak of humanitarian morality,” but which, in their terms, is nonetheless a “military action—in other words, war” (22). Historical divergences and geographical convergences notwithstanding, Atanasoski and the contributors to Fassin and Pandolfi’s edited collection are equally committed to investigating the historical ramifications of and the political repercussions from military interventions—however humanitarily rationalized—into the breach of national sovereignty that finds itself challenged by various cataclysms, natural and/or political, or both.

Duro Kolak is the eponymous “hired man” in Aminatta Forna’s Croatia-set novel—set, however, in the period just following the years-long U.S./NATO drastic interventions into Eastern Europe in the 1990s—“hired,” that is, by new property owners from Britain in his small, but still strife-conflicted, town of Gost. Duro, who has developed a working relationship with the newcomers, invites the post-conflict “interveners” to his home for a meal, taking pains to parse the several distinctions that might differentiate among the even now intruding invitees. The very name of the town, Gost, Duro tells the recently arrived foreign tenants of one of its abandoned houses, means “visitor.” But “No,” the hired hand goes on inquiringly, “let me be more precise. In English you would say guest. Is that right?” Without waiting for an answer, Duro expands further on his own query, and with provocatively underlying implications for the larger and still resonating question of “intervention”: “Guest and visitor mean more or less the same thing. Although guest is somehow more special. Anyone can be a visitor. A guest,” Duro specifies, “is somebody who is being treated in a certain way, the way you’d treat somebody you had asked to your home. Hopefully you’d treat a visitor that way too, but not necessarily.” The hired hand goes on to clarify the subtly subversive difference, with reference to Gost in particular—and perhaps more generally in regard to “humanitarian intervention”: “Mountain people have a very strong tradition,” he explains, “of hospitality. In such a place a traveller’s survival often depends on it. Also, in those days of wars and bandits, I suppose people thought if they treated a stranger as their guest, then he wouldn’t do them harm.”<sup>6</sup>

\* \* \*

Wouldn’t do them harm...? Indeed. According to Atanasoski’s critical review, however, of the “U.S. deployment of diversity” in its half-century exercise of “humanitarian violence” extending from the disastrous Vietnam War (1954-1975), through its nefarious contributions

---

<sup>5</sup> Antony Anghie, “Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law,” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 5 (2009), 293.

<sup>6</sup> Aminatta Forna, *The Hired Man* (Bloomsbury, 2013), 107-108.

to the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, to the ferocious 1999 NATO bombardment of Serbia and Kosovo, “Fighting to bring inhuman geographies into the fold of historical progress, humanitarian wars against terror, or atrocity, are regarded as a sacrifice to humanize the world” (14). That “sacrifice,” she continues, ultimately generates something like a “human rights spectacle,” an extravaganza of sorts, that in turn profits from, even profiteers in, what is further identified as a “global morality market” (16). The account of that iniquitous process as told in *Humanitarian Violence* is organized through a macro-narrative of postsocialism and the demise and putative disappearance of the Soviet empire and other non-European empires and colonialisms. In this regard, Atanasoski’s version of “humanitarian intervention” differs importantly from the essays collected in *Contemporary States of Emergency* with their overall, though not exclusive, attention instead to the postcolonial—rather than postsocialist—trajectory of the British and French empires and their seemingly similar cataclysmic legacies.

Following its introduction on the “racial reorientation of U.S. humanitarian imperialism,” in particular the “contemporary collusion between postsocialist imperialism and human rights,” *Humanitarian Violence* concludes in specifying the “hidden geographies” that lie “beyond spectacle,” the “ideological continuities,” that is, that connect “Cold War racial liberalism and post-9/11 militarism” (200). The five intervening chapters trace a compelling historical trajectory that opens with perspicacious literary readings of the memoirs of three U.S. visitors (or guests?) to the Soviet Union, memoirs that span the transition from the Cold War to the immediate post-Cold War eras: African American Andrea Lee’s *Russian Journal* (1981), Afro-Russian journalist Yelena Khanga’s *Soul to Soul: The Story of a Black Russian American Family 1865-1992* (1992), and *Balkan Ghosts* (1993) by Robert Kaplan. The first chapter, “Racial Time and the Other: Mapping the Postsocialist Transition,” emphasizes the featured transition entailed so problematically in the terminological “post”-ings. Framing thusly the historical narrative that will be addressed in the ensuing four chapters, Atanasoski maintains that, “With the advent of postsocialism, U.S. conceptions of saving the world for history (and historical progress) refigured the Cold War paradigm of saving the world from communism to that of saving the world from humanitarian atrocities” (39). In other words, the “opposition between U.S. freedom and Communist totalitarianism gave way to a new opposition between multicultural tolerance and ethnoreligious hatred” (59).

That latest “opposition” (or binary, as another vocabulary might denote it), however, was always already inherent in the prosecution of the U.S. war in (on) Vietnam, a multi-decade “event” that Atanasoski describes as nothing short of “decisive” in the elaboration of “U.S. postsocialist empire building” (75). In Chapter 2, then, the critic of U.S. humanitarian violence addresses directly the question of “the Vietnam War and the ethics of failure.” As in the previous chapter, Atanasoski grounds her epochal analysis in specific textual readings, in this instance Joseph Conrad’s classic 1898 novella, *Heart of Darkness*, the ex post facto cinematic reflections on Francis Ford Coppola’s 1979 blockbuster film *Apocalypse Now*, *Hearts of Darkness: A Filmmaker’s Apocalypse* (1991), and Jessica Hagedorn’s 2003 quasi-documentary novel *Dream Jungle*. Nor, in these three exemplary cases, is it simply the textual that the critic examines. If the camera might have functioned in the 1960s anti-war environment as “an unlikely weapon that effected moral outrage in the U.S. citizenry” (74), that same camera—the Kodak—had been no less determining in mobilizing opposition, popular, political, even corporate, to Leopold II’s Belgian atrocities in his private Congo fiefdom that Conrad’s storied Euro-African tale of an errant Marlow and the rogue Kurtz—and his shaded and shady Intended—had both exposed and concealed. According to

Atanasoski, the late nineteenth century novella represents humanitarianism as a “moral by-product of imperial excess, the idea [as Marlow himself would have it] that redeems the European soul” (87). A century later—and continents away—as well as across the intervening imperial replacements, the Coppola apocalyptic saga, *Hearts of Darkness*, is described again as yet another self-indulgent “instrumentalization of colonial spaces to dramatize imperial self-reflection,” whereas the probing reading of *Dream Jungle* serves to confirm further the “complicity of the project of documenting the sorrow of the other with the violence inherent in war” (97).

If the three focal texts that in this chapter serve to situate the U.S. Vietnam War in the longer geo-historical trajectory from late nineteenth century British imperialism to its post-World War II successions (hardly successes) on the part of a United States heir to a dubious and onerous distinction, “Restoring National Faith,” and its narration of the “Soviet-Afghan war in U.S. media and politics,” specifies instead the immediate prelude to the era critically identified by Atanasoski as decidedly postsocialist—and the attendant U.S. covert aid globally distributed so concupiscently, from the Contras in Nicaragua, to anti-Marxist guerrillas in Angola, to mujahideen in Afghanistan (107-108). *Humanitarian Violence’s* final three chapters thus turn in particular to this erstwhile “second-world” geography: the Soviet-Afghan war (Chapter 3), Serbia and Kosovo (Chapter 4), and the former Yugoslavia (Chapter 5). In her discussion of the eventualities of the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war, Atanasoski is concerned to highlight the ways in which the “closing off of Afghanistan to foreign journalists led to a unique genre of [western/U.S.] reporting in the 1980s” (116). That “genre” recuperated in significant fashion an earlier pastime of British imperial interlopers—visitors and/or guests, if you will—in the Middle East, ersatz pilgrims such as the intrepid Charles Doughty and an equally scurrilous Richard Burton whose variously notorious travels in “Arabia deserta” became the stuff of best-sellers in their own time, at the acme of British empire-building. According to Atanasoski, and citing examples from CBS’s Dan Rather, *National Geographic* cover stories, and another blockbuster film, *Charlie Wilson’s War* (2007), that is, this “unique genre of reporting” in the context of the Soviet-Afghan war was “one in which the reporters [a la Doughty and Burton] attempted to dress and look like Afghans in order to cross the border and deliver news that in their view the U.S. public needed to hear” (116). The “cover stories” change yet again, however, in the next chapter—on “Dracula as Ethnic Conflict,” or the “technologies of humanitarian interventionism in Serbia and Kosovo.” Returning once more to nineteenth century British imperial precedents to U.S. globalitarian ambitions, Atanasoski nonetheless grounds her analyses still more firmly in the Eastern European transition to postsocialism, as Bram Stoker’s celebrated “Gothic imagery about the Balkans” (120) makes way for a late twentieth century Operation Allied Force’s “Gothic tropes to portray ‘ethnic hatreds’ in the region” (131). The seemingly relentless teleology of “humanitarian violence” is extended then as “the monstrosity of ethnic conflict reminded the United States of its own past of genocide, slavery, and nativist violence was subsumed in the deployment of the ‘civilizing technologies’ of the U.S.-led Western ‘humanitarian’ imperialism to stop the blood shed in the Balkans” (134).

Perhaps because, “Like the vampire, who is described in [*Dracula*] as a ‘criminal’ type, Milosevic was the figure in the 1990s against whom the U.S.-led West established a new global order in which the West continually reimagines the face of the enemy and dubs it criminal” (162). The Serbian politician, Slobodan Milosevic, was indicted in 1999 for “crimes against humanity” committed in Croatia and Bosnia and brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), its own, international, kind of “truth

commission” and, like the consentaneous International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a harbinger perhaps of the International Criminal Court [ICC]—but the Serb leader died in custody in 2006 before the tribunal’s verdict could be effected. The final chapter of *Humanitarian Violence* turns then to the more litigious version of the “U.S. deployment of diversity,” and the “feminist politics of secular redemption at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.” Notoriously, it was only in the course of the protracted ICTY hearings that rape, with reference in particular to the atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslim women, was acknowledged as a “war crime” under international humanitarian law (IHL). Reading closely the records of the Tribunal itself as well as the reports of the forensic investigations into the allegations against the multitudinous Serbian defendants who, like Milosevic, were being prosecuted in The Hague, Atanasoski critically envisions in the ICTY—and other international tribunals—potentially perilous “modes of geopolitical governance that bring rogue nations and their inhabitants into the fold of postsocialist humanity” (170). As guests, however? Or as visitors? Or even, according to the current locution, as humanitarian interventionists? What might Duro, the Croatian “hired man,” have had to say in such circumstances?

\* \* \*

According to Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, in their introduction to *Contemporary States of Emergency*, and continuing Atanasoski’s concluding, if inconclusive, topos of customarily legal protocols, “Humanitarianism has become the justification for extralegal action.... [H]umanitarianism is still a law of the strongest” (13). Fassin and Pandolfi’s edited volume, differently but complementarily to *Humanitarian Violence*, maps not a U.S.-centric, postsocialist geopolitics, but rather underwrites in the concert of contributions a “new geography of conflicts and, with it, a new international political order” (13). If the ICTY deliberations and decisions brought to an end Atanasoski’s narrative account of the “U.S. deployment of diversity,” Fassin and Pandolfi, together with their interdisciplinary colleagues, argue against the globally aggrandizing deployment of the self-righteously extralegal and the self-promulgating extraterritorial toward “a new configuration of violence” (22). Divided into three sections—“Foundations,” “Scenes,” and “Landscapes”—*Contemporary States of Emergency*’s essays articulate a narrative that is at once historical and cartographic, identifying colonial depredations, anti-colonial struggles, decolonizing debacles, and postcolonial promises—and pitfalls.

The emphasis is thus necessarily not only on “contemporary” states of emergency, but on what relief agencies and humanitarian aid workers sometimes refer to as “complex” emergencies, occasions that defy the very definition of “emergency,” as Craig Calhoun iterates it: “a sudden, unpredictable event emerging against a background of ostensible normalcy, causing suffering or danger and demanding urgent response” (30). The “complex humanitarian emergency,” however, as Calhoun concludes in “The Idea of Emergency: Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)order” (the first essay in the “Foundations” section) and drawing on historical examples that reach, reversing Fornasari’s itinerary, from the 1755 Lisbon earthquake through the breakup of former Yugoslavia to contemporary Central African wars and genocides, necessarily combines an emergency’s “sense of urgency” to provide immediate relief aid to victims with the competing imperatives of longer-term development assistance (53). There is, Calhoun speculates, an “emergency imaginary” (31) whose already fractured parameters are further factionalized by the multiple—and often nonconsensual—parties to the political conflict and/or natural disaster. Adi Ophir, in the

following essay on the “politics of catastrophization” in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, dismantles a self-interested politics according to which emergencies are calculatedly “operationalized,” if only to make the “zone of emergency governable again” (71-73). Ugo Mattei goes on then to expand those calculations into a discussion of “emergency-based predatory capitalism,” according to which the sustainability of legal negotiations serves ultimately to “cover projects of domination” (90). Mattei’s excoriation of the rhetorics of development includes among its targets both of the Cold War imperialist blocs—by this time, neither visitors nor guests—and their postcolonial/postsocial exercise of “renewed influence on the newly independent states that entered into the assembly of sovereign nations” (100). Chowra Makaremi pursues that historically expansive critique in her reading of the prevailing doctrine du jour of a “responsibility to protect” (or R2P) as a strategic masking of a refashioning of the “idea of human security as a practice of government in response to the narrative of global chaos” (108), more interested—and invested—in population control than in the care for peoples. Vanessa Pupuvac concludes this opening, “foundational,” section of *Contemporary States of Emergency* with a historical reprise of a “genealogy of humanitarian sensibilities,” and a focused reading of Britain’s 1807 Slave Trade Act and the precedents set already in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by the example of William Wilberforce’s “mix of moral evangelism, paternalism, and antidemocratic politics” that continue to inflect today’s still more consumerist currents of what Pupuvac derisively denominates as humanitarianism’s color-coordinated “ribbon culture” (143).

The geopolitics of “contemporary states of emergency” are localized in the following section of the volume, “Scenes,” whose essays, even as they implicitly reference, for example, Atanasoski’s chronicle of postsocialism, relocate the plotlines intercontinentally as well: in the Balkans, yes, but in Africa too, and Latin America, Australia, as well as in east Asia. The section opens, however, in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the still disputed home of the “hired man,” although the very denomination is parsed critically by Pandolfi. There is a difference, that is, according to the writer, between referring to the strife-torn region as “Southeastern Europe” and/or “Western Balkans,” a difference that could ultimately count in sorting the “triage of lives worth living” (155). Are the Balkans, Pandolfi queries, the “first EU colony?” (168). And just how would such a distinction temporize the larger response to a “permanent [not just complex] state of emergency”? Those historico-geo-political lines are yet more complicated in Peter Redfield’s essay on Doctors Without Borders, their work specifically in Uganda, and what the critic rehistoricizes as an international “lineage of inhuman events” (173). Between the “morality of the moment” (187) and the seemingly sovereignty-transgressing imperative of “sans frontieres,” what, Redfield asks, is to be made of the “temporal profile of humanitarian practice” (181)? If Paula Vásquez Lezama attempts to respond to that query with respect to the “management of natural disaster in Venezuela” and the catastrophic 1999 mudslide that just happened to co-occur with a constitutional referendum, Deirdre Howard-Wagner investigates a related coincidence in Australia’s unruly and dysfunctional governing of its “indigenous communities,” a prevarication, she maintains, that serves yet again as a “pretext for regulation for social life” (231). These ultimately deadly byways culminate in the space of post-conflict Aceh, where anthropologists and donors vie, according to Mary-Jo DelVecchio, Byron J. Good and Jesse Grayman, in their assessments of the “politics of collaboration” in a multinational competition that only contributes to yet another of the “complex engagements” in and over these precarious intercontinental spaces.

The “landscapes” of the intercontinental spaces—and their academic and institutional coordinates that transect the geopolitical axes of both postsocialism and postcolonialism

alike—are explored in the volume’s five concluding essays by a group of prominent anthropologists and human rights critics who comment variously—as perhaps at once guests, visitors, and “hired hands” in their own write—on the conflicted “politics of military and humanitarian interventions.” Didier Fassin, coeditor of the volume and with a background in Médecins sans Frontières, outlines the “world according to humanitarianism,” from MSF’s postings in Kosovo to their positions in and on the crises in Angola, both summing up and reconstituting the narrative in literary generic terminology: as, on the one hand, the “romance of humanitarian adventure,” and, on the other, the “epic self-narrative of nongovernmental organizations” (273). For Fassin, in other words, humanitarianism, represents a “new repertoire for public action” (274) enjoining new roles too for guests, visitors, and hired hands, interventioneers of all stripes, so to speak. For Alex de Waal, however, at least when scrutinized in the context of two less than effective, if not altogether disastrous, U.S. military interventions and/or popular mobilizations—Operation Restore Hope (Somalia 1992) and the Save Darfur Campaign (2005-2008)—the concern is with a “humanitarianism unbound” (303), which Laurence McFalls in turn identifies as culminating in nothing short of yet another “benevolent dictatorship” (331). And thus, if legal scholar Anne Orford raises questions about the “proper limits and ends of protective authority [that] are raised today by the conduct of the war on terror, the embrace of the responsibility to protect at the UN, the integration of development and security in the work of international and nongovernmental organizations” (352), anthropologist George E. Marcus concludes by posing the attendant quandary: that of the “predicament of the producer of anthropological knowledge ‘as usual’ in contemporary regimes of multilateral intervention” (358). How are “working scholars,” Marcus asks, “involved [whether as experts, reporters, or witnesses] in the landscapes of the regimes of intervention” (360)? As guests, visitors—or hired hands? Don’t, however, as Aminatta Forna admonished, “judge a book by its author.” Where, after all, “should a bookshop shelve a novel set in Croatia and written in English by a Scottish Sierra Leonian author?” And where to place even *Humanitarian Violence* or *Contemporary States of Emergency* for that matter?

Barbara Harlow  
 Louann and Larry Temple Centennial Professor of English Literatures  
 University of Texas at Austin

© 2015: Barbara Harlow

Authors retain the rights to their review articles, which are published by SCTIW Review with their permission. Any use of these materials other than educational must provide proper citation to the author and SCTIW Review.

Citation Information

Harlow, Barbara, *Interventioneers: Humanitarian, Military, or Otherwise*, *SCTIW Review*, June 23, 2015.  
<http://sctiw.org/sctiwreviewarchives/archives/626>.

ISSN: 2374-9288